As negotiations begin in Switzerland between the US and Iran, the possibility looms that President Trump’s frustration from his inability to win the war or to end the war without the appearance of total capitulation will boil over into a renewal of fighting. Given Trump’s character, this may have to do with developments in the negotiations, or simply with a mood swing. Here are a few notes intended to clarify the differences between policy and tantrum.
First, Iran is treating the “Memorandum of Understanding” between the US and Iran very seriously, while Trump and his negotiators regard the MoU as flexible and aspirational. For a reminder of what these 14 points are that established a ceasefire and outlined the process for a 60-day ceasefire to negotiate on the many items in dispute, read the June 17th CNN publication of the 14 points here.
Second, as evidenced by US statements by Trump, Vance, and Rubio since last weekend, having lost the military war and, by signing the MoU having effectively conceded to Iran’s main demands, the US is now attempting to claw back some points already conceded. Perhaps what was lost on the battlefield can be retrieved at the negotiating table.
Third, point #1 of the MoU calls for the cessation of hostilities, including in southern Lebanon, and the restoration of the “sovereignty” of all nations including Lebanon. Iran interpreted Israel’s bombing of Beirut late last week, which killed 83 people, to be a violation of the MoU point #1, and announced the closure of the strait of Hormuz, blocking shipping. Whether and how much this continues is unclear to me. This sets the stage for the events of this week.
ON MONDAY, on Democracy Now!, Spencer Ackerman reviewed the weekend events and especially the role of Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz as the key element in Iran’s ability to enforce the terms of the MoU. AND ON TUESDAY, June 23, Jeremy Scahill and others from Drop Site news reviewed the status of the negotiations and the disruption caused by Israel’s attack on Lebanon. (I especially recommend Scahill’s summary of the status of negotiations, beginning at 12:50 into the program.) [Link].
Both articles linked above noted the importance of Israel’s aggression in Lebanon as it relates to the negotiations between the US and Iran. Iran’s closure of the Strait in response to Israel’s violation of Point #1 of the MoU establishing the ceasefire confirms that Iran takes the interests of its ally Hezbollah very seriously, and will risk re-starting the war if Israel is not made to cooperate with the terms of the ceasefire. This raises a serious dilemma for Trump: whether to continue the US blank check for Israel or demand obedience from Israel when larger US/Trump interests are involved. Indeed, this raises the question of whether a permanent change, a demotion of US support for Israel, is underway. THIS IS THE FOCUS of an interesting/useful video with Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute, Laura Friedman of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, and Iran expert Barbara Slavin [Link].
FINALLY, highly recommend is this New York Times opinion piece by David Wallace-Wells, “7 Lessons and Consequences of the Iran War [Link]. [h/t JG] Wallace-Wells writes:
“Let’s assume, for now, that the Iran war is actually over — that the “memorandum of understanding” will be honored, that Israel will cease its attacks on Lebanon, and that Iran will relinquish military control over the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps this is an unsafe bet. But if it is over, what kind of war was it?:
And Wallace-Wells enumerates ways in which the war was/is different from previous US wars of aggression, from Vietnam to recent times. Probably of greatest importance, he writes:
But another was the way that actual hot war quickly became a new kind of hybrid conflict dominated by economic pressure and punctuated only occasionally by actual attacks. Even in the recent past, sanctions and trade war were tools used earlier in the escalation game, before military forces were deployed, and typically in the name of avoiding out-and-out fighting. In Iran, escalation worked in a different way, with conflict evolving out of the military sphere and into what seemed like the more consequential game of economic hostage-taking.
Note that Wallace-Wells concedes at the outset that hopes for an end to this war are perhaps “an unsafe bet.” It certainly seems that way to me. But with so many balls/balloons in the air, the efforts of a determined antiwar/pro-peace movement may make a difference. Let’s keep up our clamor for an end to this stupid, dangerous war.
Frank Brodhead
For Concerned Families of Westchester
